Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station P. O. Box 402 Mineral, Virginia 23117

December 23, 1999

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

NAPS: JHL Docket No.: 50-339 License No.: NPF-7

Serial No.: 99-607

Dear Sirs:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit 2.

Report No. 50-339/99-004-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Matthews Site Vice President

Commitments contained in this letter. None

Enclosure

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

> Mr. M. J. Morgan NRC Senior Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station

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PDR ADOCK 05000339

NRC FORM 366 (6-1998)

#### U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

#### APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request. 50 feet. Reported seasons learned are recorporated into the Bornship process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding Surden satisfacts to the Record Management Branch (T-o F23), U.S. Nacional Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2555-0001, and in the Page-with Reduction Project (\$155-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 25050. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or specially, as a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

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#### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000339

TITLE (

# MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF FEEDWATER PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION

EVENT DATE (5)		LER NUMBER (6) REPO			RT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)							
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12	02	1999	1999	004	00	12	23	1999	FACILITY NAME				DOCUMENT NUMBER 05000-		
OPERA	TING		THIS F	EPORT IS SI	JBMITTED	PURSUA	OT TO	THE RE	QUIREME	NTS OF	10 CFR 5: (Che	ck one or m	ore) (1	1)	
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									50.73(a)(2)(vii)		or in NRC Form 366A				
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W. R. Matthews, Site Vice Pres							eside	ent			(540) 894-2101			,	
			COM	PLETE ONE I	INE FOR	ACH CO	MPONE	NT FAI	URE DES	CRIBE	IN THIS REPOR	RT (13)			
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YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).					×	NO		SUBMISSION DATE							

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, Le., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On December 2, 1999, at 1647 hours, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 operating at approximately 98% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to the loss of two of three main feedwater pumps. The main feedwater pumps tripped on low suction pressure due to the loss of discharge flow from the "A" high pressure heater drain pump following a secondary plant transient. The auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically actuated following the reactor trip to restore inventory in the steam generators. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv) for any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS).

The cause of the event is attributable to the failure of a feedwater heater level control switch to properly actuate. A root cause evaluation of the event is being performed.

This event posed no significant safety implications. The reactor was safely shut down and ESF equipment operated properly. The health and safety of the public were not affected.

## TEXT CONTINUATION

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#### 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

On December 2, 1999, at 1647 hours, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 operating at approximately 98% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to the loss of the "A" and "B" main feedwater pumps (2-FW-P-1A and B) (EIIS System - SJ, Component - P). The "C" main feedwater pump (2-FW-P-1C) remained in operation during the event.

The initiation of the event (occurring with Unit 2 at 100% power) was the closure of the "1A" feedwater heat exchanger (2-FW-E-1A) (EIIS Component - HX) cascade valve (2-SD-LCV-203A) (EIIS System - SN, Component - LCV) to the "2A" feedwater heat exchanger (2-FW-E-2A). This resulted in a 2-FW-E-1A Hi/Hi level alarm and a reduction in main feedwater pump suction pressure. The third condensate pump (2-CN-P-1C) (EIIS System - SD) was previously tagged, due to concern for a potential failure of the suction expansion joint (EIIS Component - EXJ) which was visibly deformed, and was unavailable to completely restore feedwater suction pressure. The Hi/Hi level in the 2-FW-E-1A resulted in the closure of the first point extraction steam motor-operated valve (2-ES-MOV-201A) (EIIS System - SE, Component - V) causing cooler water to enter the steam generators (EIIS System - AB). The highest power level indicated by nuclear instrumentation was 101.2%. A ramp down to approximately 98% power was implemented. At this point, the "1A" feedwater heat exchanger cascade valve (2-SD-LCV-203A) was manually isolated.

While investigating the closure of 2-SD-LCV-203A, a 2-FW-E-2A Hi/Hi level alarm was received when the level switch cover was removed. The second point extraction steam motor-operated valve (2-ES-MOV-202A) isolated due to the Hi/Hi level alarm in the "2A" feedwater heat exchanger. A ramp down of 1% per minute was initiated. Approximately one minute later, 2-FW-P-1A tripped on low suction pressure and the "1B" main feedwater pump (2-FW-P-1B) automatically started. A 4% percent per minute ramp down was initiated. The "A" high pressure heater drain pump (2-SD-P-1A) (EIIS System - SN), which pumps heater drains into the feed pump suction line, was then manually stopped due to low and fluctuating discharge pressure. Main feedwater pump 2-FW-P-1B subsequently tripped on low suction pressure. At 1647 hours, the reactor was manually tripped due to the loss of two of three main feedwater pumps on low suction pressure. The auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started following the manual reactor trip and were secured upon restoration of steam generator level. The "C" main feedwater pump remained in service during the event to provide feed flow to the steam generators. The steam dumps opened to the condenser (EIIS Component - COND) to remove excess heat.

Control Room personnel responded to the reactor trip in accordance with procedure 2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Primary plant response was normal for this transient. Initially, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure decreased to approximately 1970 psig. NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

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pressurizer level decreased to 24%, and RCS temperature decreased to approximately
546 degrees F. Pressurizer pressure, level and RCS temperature subsequently returned
to their normal programmed values. All ESF equipment responded as designed.

On December 2, 1999, at 1811 hours, a four hour report was provided to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii) due to the reactor trip and auxiliary feedwater pump actuation. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv) for any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS).

#### 2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

This event posed no significant safety implications. The reactor was safely shut down and ESF equipment operated properly. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event. The ability to remove heat by normal secondary plant equipment remained in service during this event.

#### 3.0 CAUSE

The cause of the event is attributable to the failure of a feedwater heater level control switch to properly actuate. A root cause evaluation of the event is being performed.

### 4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

Following the reactor trip, Operations Emergency Procedure 2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection was entered and immediate actions were performed to bring Unit 2 to a safe stable condition. The post trip response progressed as expected and the operators transitioned to 2-ES-0.1, Post Trip Recovery. Unit 2 was stabilized at no-load conditions.

#### 5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A "Post Trip Review" meeting was conducted with station personnel, on December 2, 1999, to identify the cause of the event, identify abnormal or degraded indications occurring during the reactor trip, and to assess Unit readiness for return to operation.

Equipment malfunctions were appropriately dispositioned and Unit 2 was returned to power operations on December 3, 1999. A root cause evaluation of the event is being performed. Following completion of the root cause evaluation, any additional recommended corrective actions will be evaluated and implemented, as required.

#### 6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

None.

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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#### 7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS

None.

### 8.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Unit 1 was at 100% power and not affected by this event.